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Postnatal human genetic 
enhancement – a consideration  
of children’s right to Be genetically 
enhanced
Sivan Tamir*
Genetic Policy and Bioethics Unit, Sheba Medical Center, The Gertner Institute for Epidemiology and Health Policy Research, 
Ramat-Gan, Israel
This paper considers children’s rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is 
focused on the futuristic prospect of postnatal GE, namely, genetic modifications, in vivo, 
of actual existing individuals. More specifically, the paper examines whether, in a future 
reality where pre- and postnatal human GE is safely and prevalently practiced, a child 
would have a right to be genetically enhanced by her parents or guardians, as well as 
the right not to be genetically enhanced. It is in fact the postnatal phase, inhabited by 
persons of indisputable moral status, subject of rights against others, which makes the 
child’s putative right (not) to be genetically enhanced a relevant and legitimate subject 
of exploration. Since postnatal GE is a futuristic technology, an appropriate, concrete, 
rights-discourse has not yet been developed. In this paper, I therefore attempt to initiate 
such discourse, by identifying, through legal analysis, potential sources for the child’s right 
to be genetically enhanced, and theorizing about its nature (derivative, or a newly created 
independent right; positive or negative right). I begin by considering several (mostly) con-
temporary candidate core rights, from which the child’s right to be genetically enhanced 
could potentially derive; next, I consider the child’s right not to be genetically enhanced, 
through ethical analysis; finally, I look into the merits of creating such a novel right of the 
child. I conclude, that the direct translation of the child’s interests in being genetically 
enhanced, into any kind of recognized positive or negative right – whether derivative or a 
newly emerging independent right – is unlikely. As per the putative child’s right not to be 
genetically enhanced postnatally, I determine that such a right could be recognized as 
a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing and shaping one’s child.
Keywords: human genetic enhancement, postnatal, prenatal genetic enhancement, children’s rights, autonomy, 
open future
inTrODUcTiOn
The year is 2053. Human genetic enhancement (HGE) is safely and prevalently practiced 
pre- and postnatally, and is part of health care or welfare programs typically managed 
under the Ministry of Enhanced Living. Guy London is a 3-year-old infant. Guys’ parents 
opt to purchase for him the Deluxe Enhancement Package for Athletic & Sociable Boys. 
The package offers a series of genetic modifications that guarantee, to a certain extent, 
that Guy’s personal traits and physical characteristics will be predominantly those of a 
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promising outgoing, popular athlete. Does Guy have 
a valid right to be genetically enhanced (including the 
right NOT to be thus modified)? Would Guy’s putative 
right be deemed any differently if Guy were a 12-year-
old boy or a 16-year-old adolescent?
This paper is about children’s rights with respect to genetic 
enhancement (GE). In particular, it examines whether in a future 
reality where pre- and postnatal HGE is safely and widely prac-
ticed, a child would have a right against her parents or guardians 
to be genetically enhanced by them,1 as well as the right not to be 
genetically enhanced. The paper initiates a rights-discourse on 
Guy’s and his peers’ claims with respect to their postnatal HGE 
(PoGE), by positing and attempting to answer two principal 
questions. The first, a future-looking question resting on positive 
(presently applying) law: would it be possible to derive a child’s 
right to PoGE from contemporary core rights? The second is a 
normative one: should we create or recognize a novel child’s right 
to PoGE?
Arguably, such (putative) rights-discourse can only take 
place in an uncontentious manner, in the realm of PoGE, where 
the subjects of GE are actual, presently existing individuals, as 
opposed to future persons of controversial moral status, e.g., 
embryos or fetuses, who occupy the realm of prenatal GE (PGE).
The scholarly literature on HGE has been typically and 
predominantly focused on prenatal enhancement. The human 
enhancement debate is overwhelmingly concerned with tar-
geted genetic modification of the embryo in  vitro, speculating 
on the implications of inheritable genetic alterations for future 
generations, for the human species as such, for the soundness of 
human nature and for society at large [see, e.g., Fukuyama (2002), 
Habermas (2003), and Sandel (2007)], while largely disregard-
ing postnatal, somatic cell (uninherited) genetic modifications 
in vivo, of existing individuals. This paper, however, is concerned 
with the latter; particularly, with GE – narrowly defined as purely 
elective, i.e., non-therapeutic2 genetic modification – of children. 
It offers an original analysis of children’s (putative) right to be 
genetically enhanced postnatally, introducing a fresh perspective 
on the position of minors with regard to their own GE, and their 
power to make right claims in this context.
I posit that exploring particular aspects of PoGE, such as chil-
dren’s rights with respect to this technology, is a timely discussion 
(as well as a beneficial thought experiment), in the sense that such 
development is anticipated. This assertion hinges on the assump-
tion that in the relatively not-so-distant future (i.e., within a few 
decades) scientists and technology will be able to surmount the 
current scientific hurdles that stand in the way of effective post-
natal manipulation of desired characteristics through somatic cell 
modification.
In order for such a targeted genetic intervention to be success-
ful in the postnatal stage, two fundamental capacities are required: 
(1) the ability to perfectly target and correctly identify the gene(s) 
1 I have elsewhere also analyzed the putative duty of the state to genetically enhance 
children, in lieu of their parents; see Tamir (2015, p. 241–269) and Tamir (2016). 
2 I intentionally avoid discussing the child’s putative right to therapeutic GE (i.e., 
gene therapy) in this paper, focusing merely on the seemingly “harder” case of 
purely elective, voluntary (social pressure aside) GE. 
responsible for the traits that are candidates for enhancement 
and to decipher their activity. This will be particularly challenging 
with respect to polygenic traits (i.e., the product of the interaction 
of multiple genes), or complex, multifactorial traits targeted for 
enhancement (e.g., intelligence, athleticism). Such traits entail 
variation within multiple genes, and their interaction with behav-
ioral and environmental factors. This, combined with our current 
epigenetics ignorance,3 undeniably sets further hurdles for the 
effective enhancement of desirable traits; and (2) the capability to 
efficiently modify the DNA of each and every cell specialized for a 
particular trait elected for enhancement. Both capacities are cur-
rently gravely lacking and would present challenging problems 
for “enhancement-enthusiasts” scientists.
Now, once such obstacles are overcome and the PoGE technol-
ogy is proved to be safe, I can easily (even if somewhat reluctantly) 
imagine it becoming simply another parental rearing and shaping 
tool of one’s children. This “tool” could be analogized to several 
contemporary examples of postnatal biological, or biomedical 
non-genetic enhancements (i.e., for non-therapeutic purposes), 
already applied to minors, underpinning various parental 
(and child) motivations for shaping and improving children. 
Prominent examples are: elective cosmetic surgery and human 
growth hormone treatment for ameliorating appearance (thereby 
potentially boosting the child’s self-esteem and social status), and 
neuroenhancement by performance-enhancing psychotropic 
drugs (methylphenidate, e.g., Ritalin, and dexamphetamine 
compounds, e.g., Adderall), for enhancing cognitive abilities of 
healthy subjects (Tamir, 2015, p. 43–56; Tamir, 2016, p. 6–10).
My assumption that the scientific obstacle will eventually be 
surmounted, thus paving the way to the application of PoGE, is 
based on two things:
(a) Several emerging indications that science is steadily moving 
toward postnatal human genetic modification; for instance, 
scientific advancements such as CRISPR-Cas9,4 a seemingly 
promising artificial genome editing technology, allowing 
specific, refined, and precise engineering of the human 
DNA (De Chant and Nelsen, 2014; Pak, 2014; Organizing 
Committee for the International Summit on Gene Editing, 
2015). It is also “relatively safe, technically accessible, and 
affordable, essentially bringing about the ‘democratization of 
gene targeting’” (Travis, 2015; Tamir, 2016). This technique 
uses a Cas9 enzyme that snips through DNA, like a pair 
of molecular scissors, guided by a small RNA molecule to 
a specific sequence of DNA to make the cut in a controlled 
way. It exploits the cell’s DNA repair mechanism in humans, 
animals, and plants, to direct the spread of specific traits 
throughout a population, primarily in order to eradicate dis-
eases and turn back evolutionary clocks (Brice, 2013; Esvelt 
et al., 2014). In fact, as recently as February 2016, scientists in 
the UK were granted permission by the Human Fertilization 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) to genetically modify 
3 Epigenetics is the inheritable external influence of lifestyle and environmental 
factors that does not involve changes to the DNA sequence, through chemical 
alterations to the epigenome that regulate the activity (expression) of all the genes 
within the genome (Jablonka and Lamb, 2006; Rothstein et al., 2009). 
4 CRISPR – Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat. 
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human embryos in the first 7 days after fertilization, using 
the CRISPR-Cas9 technology for the first time in history, for 
research purposes of investigating miscarriages in women 
(Callaway, 2016). Now, although this genome editing tech-
nology seems to be more readily associated with therapeutic 
aims achieved through prenatal genetic modification,5 there 
is good reason to assume that such gene-editing tool could be 
harnessed in the future (perhaps with some modifications) 
to perform predesigned PoGE, or at the very least – advance 
our mastery of the targeted genetic manipulation that PoGE 
requires. Geneticist George Church, a realistic outspoken 
advocate of CRISPR, indeed anticipates the inevitable spread 
of its use from therapy to self- and child-enhancement 
(Perlman, 2015). Potential GE-related somatic cell applica-
tions of the CRISPR technology have already been suggested 
[see Polcz and Lewis (2016)] and
(b) A reasoning based on optimistic academic attitudes accept-
ing the eventual inevitability of GE technologies becoming 
part of our lives. One example for such an attitude is Nicholas 
Agar’s “pragmatic optimism” approach (Agar, 2004, p. 34–8), 
which holds that it is better to be prepared with suitable moral 
argumentation and well laid-out principles for what will 
eventually mature into existence6 – presumably, in order to 
instruct an appropriate legal-social stance – than to be caught 
unequipped to deal with the ramifications of a novel tech-
nology. Another example is Baylis and Robert’s Inevitability 
Thesis (Baylis and Robert, 2004, p. 25), providing us with a 
more elaborated theory of acceptance of or resignation to the 
possibility of GE technologies integrating into our life. Their 
thesis generally suggests that embracing GE technologies is 
an inescapable consequence of human “perfectibility and the 
biosocial drive to pursue perfection.”
And so, in this spirit of optimism, we may reasonably assert 
that PoGE will emerge as an available shaping tool, making the 
child’s putative claim right to be genetically enhanced, a relevant 
and legitimate subject of exploration.
Before delving into our analysis, I should make a preliminary 
note: since the technology of PoGE is a futuristic one and, as 
such, has hardly been analyzed in the academic literature, I use 
theoretical legal and ethical analysis of (children’s) rights relying, 
inter alia, on contemporary legal reality, as reflected in relevant 
universal conventions and U.S. and UK jurisprudence. I rely on 
existing legal framework, with the (naïve?) expectation that it will 
remain pertinent to our envisaged PoGE-future, due to the obvi-
ous limitations of accurately predicting the legal landscape in a 
few decades’ time. In short, I am fully aware of the methodological 
difficulties posed by the futurity of the technology and its hidden 
5 See, recent report on the genetic modification of defective human embryos by 
Chinese scientists, employing the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technique (Cyranoski 
and Reardon, 2015). Various other therapeutic aims of this technology (e.g., treat-
ing HIV and cancer) are also presently being researched (Saayman et  al., 2015; 
Liverpool, 2016). 
6 In fact, Agar has speculated, back in his well-known paper Liberal Eugenics 
(1998, p. 139), that “twenty-fifth century genetic engineers may be able to directly 
intervene in the genomes of existing individuals, splicing in genes for desired traits 
and snipping out those not similarly favoured.” 
(currently unknown) implications, that make such pioneering 
attempts to lay the foundations for an appropriate child’s rights 
discourse in the context of her PoGE, quite challenging.
The paper is constructed as follows: At the outset, I briefly 
introduce some of PoGE’s distinctive features and suggest two 
relevant policy considerations for us to bear in mind throughout 
our analysis. Then, I move on to analyze the core issue of this 
paper – the child’s rights with respect to PoGE. First, I analyze 
whether a child’s putative right to PoGE could be a derivative 
right of existing core rights, by examining the theoretical suitabil-
ity of several (mostly) contemporary fundamental rights. Then, I 
consider the child’s right not to be genetically enhanced by her 
parents/guardians, or the state, through an ethical analysis, where 
I critically address Joel Feinberg’s notion of “the child’s right to an 
open future,” in the context of PoGE. Finally, I consider through 
jurisprudential analysis, whether a novel, positive, or negative 
child’s right to PoGE should be recognized or created in the 
future, given the foreseeable implications of such recognition.
Poge’s MOsT DisTincTiVe FeaTUres
Focusing on GE conducted at the postnatal phase rather than on 
one conducted prenatally, holds certain advantages, particularly 
with respect to rights-discourse, which are predominantly 
attributed to the fact that this phase presents us with existing 
actual persons (children) subject for enhancement, rather than 
potential, possible or future7 ones as in the prenatal phase. Unlike 
pre-natality, post-natality provides us with persons of indisput-
able moral status; subject of rights (and duties); individuals with 
a voice to assent/consent to/reject the enhancement procedure, 
to make claims (e.g., the right to be genetically enhanced) and 
express volitions (e.g., not to be genetically enhanced), and 
opinions (with regard to the specific traits chosen for GE by the 
child’s enhancers) – what I have elsewhere termed “the presence 
benefit” (Tamir, 2016, p. 11). And perhaps, most importantly – 
post-natality provides us with an identity, which can both guide 
the enhancement plan and constrict it. That is to say, PoGE 
allows the enhancer to accommodate the enhancement plan 
(i.e., the traits targeted for enhancement) to the existing child’s 
apparent identity (an option denied from the prenatal genetic 
enhancer).
Genetically enhancing an existing individual also entails 
other, more circumstantial unique features. One such feature is 
the “transparent environment.” Namely, owing to the fact that 
PoGE is performed in  vivo rather than in  vitro, “the personal, 
social, environmental, and political state of affairs at the time the 
enhancement is carried out, is transparent to us” (Tamir, 2016, 
p.  11). This confers a further advantage upon both the child 
candidate for enhancement and the enhancers, which I term 
“enhancement in context,” an advantage that PGE obviously lacks.
7 Heyd (1992, p. 97), defines “potential persons” as “people whose existence is 
dependent on human choice,” and “possible persons,” as “persons who have not 
yet, and may not ever, come into existence.” “Future persons” are “persons who do 
not yet but will exist,” who may be included under the category of actual persons 
(Roberts and Wasserman, 2009, p. xiii). 
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Lastly, genetically enhancing existing individuals provides us 
with a relatively “flexible timeframe,” for conducting the enhance-
ment. In other words, “since we are in no rush to bring a particular 
(potential) individual into existence… [t]he enhancement plan 
could… be orchestrated to fit the enhanced child’s developmental 
stages, in order for it to be optimally assimilated into her per-
sonality and life in general” (Tamir, 2016, p. 12). Indeed, from a 
present-day scientific perspective, it is possible that there will be a 
“time window” for the modification of some traits candidate for 
PoGE in terms of the optimal potential for enhancement, mak-
ing PoGE time-sensitive, to a certain extent [see Polcz and Lewis 
(2016), p. 10]. Such recognition of the relative significance of the 
timing of enhancement in a child’s life could potentially constrain 
the rather flexible timeframe that features PoGE. However, for the 
sake of argument (and with the possibility that future scientific 
developments will render such time windows meaningless), I shall 
assume that said “time windows” will not stand in the way of PoGE 
as such, but will at most, affect its optimality. Namely, that geneti-
cally enhancing selective cognitive skills of 12-year-old guy, will be 
approximately8 as effective as the cognitive GE of 3-year-old guy.
From an identity-centered ethical perspective, generally 
speaking, it would seem plausible that the earlier the genetic 
intervention takes place, the better it is for the child candidate 
for enhancement, in terms of the enhancement’s integration into 
her identity and the consequent reduced risk of self-alienation, 
sentiments of inauthenticity and “damage” to her personal iden-
tity and self-perception (all feared-results by GE opponents; e.g., 
Habermas, 2003). On the other hand, from an autonomy-centered 
perspective – PoGE of older children, who possess a more cohe-
sive self-perception, better capacity for autonomy, and are better 
articulated in voicing their opinion with respect to the (parent- or 
self-motivated) GE, may be preferable. This perspective will be 
elaborated further below.
In sum, these features of PoGE not only allow for a proper 
child rights discourse to take place but will also compel us, as 
enhancers, to consider the position of the minor on the matter; 
namely, to be attentive to her preferences, commensurate with 
her age, and to be mindful to the putative effects of PoGE on her 
self-perception and narrative identity, particularly, in terms of the 
identity’s “intrusion tolerance” for changes brought on by the act 
of enhancement.
And so, due to obvious shortcomings of the prenatal GE set-
ting (such as non-existence and lack of standing of the subjects 
of enhancement), considering here the right to PoGE of existing 
children will provide forthright child rights talk that is unparal-
leled in the prenatal account.
The righT TO geneTic 
enhanceMenT – TWO POlicY 
cOnsiDeraTiOns
The right to GE essentially means the right to be improved in a 
targeted manner, via the application of a particular technology. 
8 See infra discussion in footnote 17, about the life-stage-dependent realization of 
the potential for enhancement. 
However, as PoGE is presently in its theoretical stage, we have 
no specific child’s right to GE nor a pertinent rights-and-duties 
discourse, to rely on. The existent set of children’s rights (to 
develop and thrive, to wellbeing, health, and well-rounded 
growth) – closely or narrowly construed – seems to refer to chil-
dren’s most essential needs, whereas PoGE obviously far exceeds 
the threshold of such “basic needs.”
We therefore ought to consider whether a right to PoGE makes 
the case for a distinct, derivative, or a novel, children’s right.
But before considering this, I should point out two general 
policy considerations that must be taken into account, prior to 
recognizing such a right:
(1) What such a right would entail in terms of desert or entitle-
ment of the child. Arguably, one could follow here the same 
line of argument of those who oppose the “best interest of the 
child” criterion: one (even a child) cannot reasonably secure 
an interest to have the best of most, against the world. After 
all, we dare not commit parents to much less demanding 
child-benefiting instruments (e.g., music lessons for musi-
cally gifted children), so extending children’s rights to include 
PoGE may seem exaggerated and over-demanding. We could 
also appeal to a sense of reasonableness or proportionality 
(i.e., human and financial resources are typically limited and 
need to be allocated to several other, more pressing objec-
tives); and to one’s sense of morality, i.e., humility. But such 
talk is mostly intuitive.
(2) The potential clash, or conflict, between such a right and 
parental autonomous discretion in rearing and shaping one’s 
children, specifically – parents’ putative autonomy-derived 
right to genetically enhance their offspring.9 Also relevant 
is the way parents’ values and prioritization considerations 
influence their decisions and actions (e.g., parents could 
afford certain PoGEs for their child, yet prefer to otherwise 
influence her personality). Furthermore, recognizing a child’s 
right to PoGE may coerce parents into shaping children in 
a manner which is inconsistent with their worldview or 
personal philosophy.
Having these considerations in mind, let us now attempt to 
identify potential sources for the child’s right to PoGE and theo-
rize about its nature.
can a chilD’s righT TO Poge Be  
a DeriVaTiVe righT? in search  
OF a sUiTaBle cOre righT
The CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989) seems 
like the natural place to begin such a quest even though there is 
no direct support for, or any indication of, “a child’s right to be 
shaped and enhanced in a targeted manner,” in the language of 
the convention. Arguably, it may be inferred from a core principle 
of the CRC – devotion to the best interests of the child, or from 
9 For a comprehensive analysis of parental autonomy and rights in the context of 
PoGE, see Tamir (2015), p. 137–165. 
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the spirit of the convention at large, but this would seem all too 
general and somewhat overreaching, for grounding a child’s 
specific derivative right to PoGE.
Children’s rights roughly consist of two main categories – both 
recognized in the CRC, acknowledging the vulnerability and 
incapacity of children and their need for safeguarding of their 
interests: (a) human and civil rights, equating children’s entitle-
ments to those of adults, e.g., the rights to dignity, autonomy, 
privacy, etc.; and (b) protective rights, such as the rights to nour-
ishment, health care, education, etc.
On its face, a claim right to PoGE cannot be appropriately 
derived from core protective rights, due to the elective, non-
essential, “privileged” nature of enhancement, making children’s 
adult-like human and civil rights, a more plausible source for core 
rights.10 Such perception of HGE, however, reflects our  present-day 
reality, and it may therefore be inappropriate to rely on in our 
reference to the future, say, circa 2053 (the year of our opening 
illustrative example). We may therefore assume, that in a time 
where HGE is safely and widely practiced – PoGE may eventually 
become the norm, a near-standard tool for rearing and shaping 
one’s child (as well as for self-improvement). This may set the 
threshold for basic needs somewhat higher than it is presently set. 
Elsewhere, I have even referred to the possibility of future society 
deeming certain types of GE a standard sine qua non necessity 
(notwithstanding its non-therapeutic, elective characterization), 
and hence the objects of children’s rights (Tamir, 2016).
Against this background assumption, we can suggest two 
CRC-based potential candidate core rights: the child’s fundamen-
tal rights to participate fully in social and political life, residing 
within the adult-like human and civil rights category; and the 
child’s fundamental rights to develop to the fullest, residing within 
the category of children’s protective rights. We shall now consider 
these candidates:
The child’s fundamental rights to participate fully in social life 
and political life (“participatory rights”). Participatory rights are 
about giving “an active voice” to children (UNICEF11), i.e., a say 
in matters affecting their social, economic, religious, cultural, and 
political life; entitling them, inter alia, to freedom of thought; to 
the right to express opinions and be heard, and to have access to 
information; to the right to privacy; etc. (CRC, art. 12–17). Now, 
assumingly, the spreading of PoGE throughout society may set 
higher thresholds for participation in social and political life. In 
other words, given our envisaged “PoGE-inclined social climate,” 
becoming genetically enhanced could be an implied condition 
for participation in social and political life in various respects, in 
the interest of fairness and equal opportunities. This would make 
participatory rights, broadly construed, potential core rights for 
the child’s right to PoGE to be derived from. Let us now move on 
to consider the other CRC-based candidate core right.
The child’s fundamental rights to develop to the fullest (“devel-
opment rights”). Development rights are essentially about the 
10 Although, according to Julian Savulescu, “…enhancement is no luxury. In so 
far as it promotes well-being, it is the very essence of what is necessary for a good 
human life Savulescu (2005 p. 38).”
11 UNICEF (accessed July 30, 2016). The Convention on the Rights of the Child – 
Participation Rights: Having an Active Voice. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/
crc/files/Participation.pdf.
child’s right to evolve and flourish, to develop her personality, 
and cultivate her talents and abilities to their fullest potential. The 
fundamental right of children to development is generally stated 
in art. 6 of the CRC (along with the rights to life and to survival). 
Development rights in more specific contexts are protected under 
the CRC (art. 6, 18, 23, 27, 29, and 32) with respect to various 
domains: physical, mental, moral, social, personality, talent, 
cultural, and spiritual (Peleg, 2013, p. 523). (Since our business 
here is with domains, which directly correspond with PoGE, the 
latter two domains are irrelevant to our discussion.) Looking 
through the lenses of our “future-glasses,” children’s development 
could be broadly construed to include personal development 
through PoGE. Take, for instance, these present references to 
children’s development rights under specific articles of the CRC: 
(a) parental responsibility “for the upbringing and development 
of the child” (CRC, art. 18). This may very well include parental 
responsibility for the child’s GE in various domains; (b) directing 
the education of the child to “[t]he development of the child’s 
personality, talents, and mental and physical abilities to their 
fullest potential” (CRC, art. 29). This may entail the provision 
of a cognitive and physical enhancement package, such as the 
kind sought for guy by his parents, in our illustrative example 
(the Deluxe Enhancement Package for Athletic & Sociable Boys).
Accordingly, the child’s right to be genetically enhanced 
postnatally may indeed be an instance, a derivative, of the child’s 
development and participatory rights, broadly construed. Or, 
rather, the derivative of children’s development and participatory 
rights would be the presently hypothetical and somewhat over-
demanding child’s “right to be improved by the most up-to-date 
technologies,” making PoGE – a part of a new specific class of 
improving technologies – a private case of such an instance 
(rather than a derivative right in and of itself). Alternatively, the 
child’s right to PoGE could be considered as an extension of the 
right to be improved by the most up-to-date technologies, though 
with no independent standing (unlike derivative rights).
Another potential candidate core right for the child’s right 
to PoGE to be derived from, is the universal “right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications,” embedded 
in article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (Gran et al., 2013). However, while 
HGE will definitely qualify as “benefiting, applicable, and scien-
tific progress,” deriving the child’s specific right to PoGE from 
this general universal right, seems to be inadequate. This is due 
to the fact, that it is essentially a form of distributive justice claim 
vis-à-vis novel goods, relating to their just and fair allocation in 
a given society. In other words, while the essence of the right to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications is 
letting everyone equally to enjoy the fruits of scientific progress, 
the child’s right to PoGE concerns a benefiting privilege for the 
single child, from an individual, non-social justice perspective.
Finally, I submit a more suitable, seemingly natural candidate 
for core human right: the “right to personal autonomy” in the 
sense of self-determination. I suggest establishing the mature 
child’s putative right to PoGE on an account of minority-
constrained (that is, not full-fledged) autonomy, which I shall 
term “minorautonomy.” I shall illustrate the appropriateness of 
minorautonomy as a core right from which the child’s right to 
PoGE may derive, in the following sections.
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Minorautonomy
The notion of “minorautonomy” is based on the assumption 
that at a certain stage of minority children too are qualifiedly 
autonomous to a certain extent. Such autonomy is typically 
somewhat restrained by parents’ (and state’s) paternalism. While 
minorautonomy as a key right in the child’s self-shaping and self-
determination processes is not necessarily an original concept – 
its application to the issue of children’s PoGE, however, is.
Minorautonomy features a dynamic transitory autonomy, in 
the sense that its limitations are gradually lifted pending adoles-
cence and removed entirely at adulthood when one becomes a 
fully capacitated individual. The concept of minorautonomy is 
consistent with the tendency of growing respect for adolescents’ 
autonomy and human dignity. It views late adolescents (17 years 
and older),12 as borderline adults and quasi-competent agents, 
capable of autonomous reasoning and nearly free authorship 
(in the sense of being the originators) of their own narrative 
identity (DeGrazia, 2005, p. 294), to a certain extent. Arguably, 
younger preteen adolescents (10–16 years) will too be inspired 
by this notion, which, at the very least, stands to cultivate a sense 
of autonomy within them. As a result of this positive spill-over 
effect, they may benefit from an autonomy-promoting environ-
ment that allows them to voice their opinion, commensurate with 
their age and individual maturity; and for their opinion to be 
taken into account, mainly by their parents who would consider 
these expressions of early autonomy legitimate and a significant 
part of their children’s developing adult autonomy.
Minorautonomy also serves a general second-order purpose 
of any liberal society: grooming children into mature, personally 
and socially responsible right-holders, by supplying them with 
tools that will gradually advance them from “their childlike state 
of dependence, vulnerability, and immaturity” toward adulthood 
(Archard, 2013).
Joseph Raz, lays out his conditions of personal autonomy: 
(1) the appropriate mental abilities to form complex intentions 
and “plan their execution” (i.e., “minimum rationality”); (2) an 
adequate range of (morally acceptable) options; and (3) independ-
ence (Raz, 1986, p. 372–8). Arguably, a late adolescent facing the 
option of PoGE amongst other self-shaping options may satisfy 
these stipulations to a significant extent.
Support for the notion of minorautonomy may be found in 
the General Comment to the CRC (Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, 2005) on the implementation of child rights in 
early childhood, that is, BELOW the age of EIGHT  years. The 
comment advocates respect for the views and feelings of the 
young child (sec. 14), perceiving young children as active social 
agents and right-holders. It also invokes the “child’s capacities for 
autonomous decision-making and comprehension of his or her 
best interests” (sec. 17).
What further supports the notion of minorautonomy is 
the charge of arbitrariness: it essentially claims that the age of 
12 Steinberg and Cauffman (1996) maintain that “[c]ontrasts between adolescents 
and adults that do not distinguish between older and younger teenagers… are likely 
flawed.” They therefore suggest creating subcategories of adolescents – distinguish-
ing between 16 and younger (early and middle adolescents), and 17 and older (late 
adolescents). 
majority, that is, the threshold of adulthood, typically set at 18 in 
most countries – is simply arbitrary. There is no marked difference 
between a 17-year-old on the verge of 18 and an 18-and-1-day-
year-old young person; at least, not one that justifies the dramatic 
change in legal status (Archard, 2013). However, it is not strictly 
biological age, but rather the correlation of age-related cognitive 
maturity with capacity, which essentially “qualifies one to have 
rights” (Archard, “Children’s Rights”). On the other hand, as life 
experience has taught us, there is good reason to distinguish 
adults from minors on grounds of their decision-making capacity.
The CRC (art. 12) has made it a universal rule that a child’s 
voice should be heard and her opinion taken into consideration, 
with respect to matters affecting the child. The article essentially 
“insists on the ‘visibility’ of children in their own right” and 
“requires that we recognize the value of their own experience, 
views and concerns” (Lansdown, 2001, p. 1). Children should 
therefore be encouraged to actively participate in decisions con-
cerning them rather than be mere “passive recipients of adult’s 
decision-making” (Lansdown, 1995, p. 2). Minorautonomy 
allows for minors capable of voicing their opinion, to participate 
in decisions such as self-shaping through PoGE.
In fact, minorautonomy already plays a progressively larger 
part in medical decision-making, where young people are being 
gradually perceived as quasi autonomous, “possess[ing] the 
capacity to appreciate their medical conditions, and … competent 
to judge treatment decisions from a fairly young age” (Singh and 
Kelleher, 2010, p. 7). We are hence called to respect their privacy 
in matters such as contraceptives, abortions, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and drug treatment.
The legal doctrine of mature minor, developed in Gillick v. West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1986), binding in 
England and Wales (and approved in Scotland, Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand), is an indication of such a determination. It 
has established that a minor under the age of 1613 can consent 
to contraceptive advice and treatment from a doctor, without 
parental consent or knowledge, providing that she can understand 
what is proposed despite her young age, and that other conditions 
of the “Fraser guidelines” (so termed after Lord Fraser’s opinion 
in Gillick), indicating a high likelihood of her continuing to have 
sexual intercourse, with or without contraceptive treatment and 
against her best interests, are met. Notably, since initially intro-
duced, the “Gillick competency” test has been extended beyond 
the realm of contraceptive advice for girls to adolescents’ other 
welfare and medical decisions (Cornock, 2007; Blyth and Frith, 
2009, p. 186).
The statutory or common-law mature minor doctrine is 
an exception to the rule requiring parental consent to minors’ 
medical treatment. The doctrine is not recognized by all states 
in the U.S. Where it is recognized, it usually applies to 16-year 
or older (unemancipated) minors facing medical decisions, 
sometimes without parental knowledge and typically without 
parental consent. They are required to prove sufficient maturity 
13 See the UK’s Family Law Reform Act (1969), allowing for minors between 16 and 
18 to consent to medical treatment (it even goes as far as to regard any such non-
consensual treatment as a trespass upon her person), making parental or guardian 
consent (where a minor’s effective consent was given) redundant. 
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and understanding with respect to the nature of the specific medi-
cal process and its consequences.14,15 Minorautonomy presumes 
that late adolescents have the required capacity and therefore the 
power to consent to PoGE (rather than merely assent in addition 
to parental/guardian consent).
Since we refer to personal autonomy in the sense of self-
determination, and as we have postulated that minorautonomy 
can only be attributed to late adolescents on the verge of adult-
hood, who typically exert more than minimal self-governance, it 
would seem relatively safe to entrust minorautonomous young 
persons with such self-shaping decisions.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that minorautonomy is a 
relative right16 and power constrained by parental autonomy and 
authority. And so, determining whether a particular minor in a 
particular setting is qualified to make certain (minor)autono-
mous decisions, will require a subjective factual determination, 
on a case-by-case basis.
Minorautonomy is also issue-relative in the sense that it is 
dependent on the particular kind of choice or activity in question 
and varies accordingly. Namely, minorautonomy would generally 
apply to decisions regarding matters that are: (a) personality-
defining; (b) closely linked to the minor’s identity; and (c) if 
deferred until adulthood, such decisions might lose some of their 
relevance and force.17
Consequently, where more general matters relating to partici-
pation in social life are concerned, minorautonomy will typically 
not apply and full-fledged autonomy will be required, even where 
the minor is situated on the threshold of majority: for example, 
a 17-year-old young person wishing to enlist in the U.S. military 
is required to produce parental consent (essentially rescinding 
minorautonomy). S/he could enlist without parental consent, as 
well as vote, at the age of 18, whereas in most U.S. jurisdictions, 
a young person will not be considered autonomous or legally 
permitted to consume alcohol before the age of 21.
Scientific Evidence Relating to Adolescent  
Decision-Making or Maturity of Judgment
The traditional empirical perception is that children and young 
persons have not yet acquired the decision-making capacity 
14“Mature-minor doctrine law & legal definition.” USLegal. Available at: http://
definitions.uslegal.com/m/mature-minor-doctrine. 
15 See the West Virginia Supreme Court ruling in Belcher v. Charleston Area 
Medical Center (1992), where the court has specified the facts to be determined in 
establishing a mature minor status. 
16 A relative right is a right, which is not absolute (see infra footnote 18), in the sense 
that it is balanced against other fundamental rights. 
17 This last criterion (c) hinges on the assumption that, for the most part, genetically 
enhancing a particular trait or several traits merely gives the genetically modified 
individual a potential for enhancement. Presumably, however, in order to realize 
this potential, one would have to: (a) truly desire and aim to achieve a particular 
goal through such enhancement and (b) to be provided with the opportunity to 
perfect her genetic-modification-given skills, and to effectively master them to 
reach the desired goal. So, it is the loss of opportunity, specifically in terms of 
its timing, that raises concern in this respect. For example: if a highly motivated, 
competitive minor wishes to enhance her athletic abilities in order to become, 
through supplemental training, an outstanding athlete – putting such enhance-
ment on hold until she becomes legally mature, say, at the age of 18, will hardly 
be relevant or effective, as she would have “squandered” away years potentially 
dedicated to honing her genetically-enhanced athletic skills. 
possessed by adults, in terms of cognitive faculties regulating 
inhibition, risk-assessment, problem solving, etc., and conse-
quently engage in risk-taking behavior and impulsive conduct, 
making suboptimal decisions that lead to increased incidence of 
harm (Cherry, 2010, p. 562). This is based on a significant body 
of neurobiological evidence indicating the ongoing development 
of the prefrontal cortex, through adolescence and into early 
adulthood.
Casey and Caudle (2013, p. 83), claim that these are mislead-
ing overgeneralizations and that where emotional information 
can be isolated and the atmosphere is “cool,” adolescents are 
“capable of acting rationally and making optimal decisions” 
as well as demonstrate impulse-control. In fact, under such 
conditions, many adolescents perform not only well, but better 
than adults! Similarly, the common charges against adolescents’ 
flawed risk-assessments are rejected by Reyna and Farley (2006, 
p. 34), who claim that adolescents do not perceive themselves as 
invulnerable and, in fact, tend to overestimate risks such as HIV 
and lung cancer.
Steinberg et  al. (2009, p. 592), suggest that 16-year-old 
adolescents’ decision-making or maturity of judgment does not 
fall short of that of adults, where emotional information can be 
isolated; social influences are “minimized or can be mitigated”; 
consultants “who can provide objective information about the 
costs and benefits of alternative courses of action” are acces-
sible; and a “deliberative, reasoned decision-making” process – 
allowed.
It would be highly speculative and difficult to envisage the 
typical conditions under which adolescents would make deci-
sions regarding their own GE. Parents and professional consult-
ants (such as physicians, geneticists, and psychotherapists) will 
probably be available for guidance. Social (peer-) pressure and 
pressing trends, however, will be difficult to escape. In fact, these 
will probably not only influence the adolescent’s decision-making, 
but inspire and motivate it in the first place.
Notwithstanding this, the evidence (succinctly described 
here) cautiously suggests that late adolescents should, in princi-
ple, be entitled to make decisions concerning their self-shaping 
through GE.
To conclude this section, given that autonomy is a foundational 
right, the above analysis may indicate that the child’s putative 
right to PoGE could, prima facie, derive from the core right to 
personal (minor)autonomy or, at least, that minorautonomy may 
create a supportive climate for the recognition of such a novel 
right. Purportedly, the same may be true for deriving said right 
from, or perceiving it as an instance of children’s development 
and participatory rights. In fact, should we acknowledge a child’s 
positive right to PoGE, such core rights may be more applicable to 
infants and younger children who cannot yet reside under mino-
rautonomy and are merely lightly influenced by the purported 
(minor)autonomy-promoting environment.
a chilD’s righT nOT TO Be 
geneTicallY enhanceD?
Minorautonomy equally entails the right NOT to be genetically 
enhanced postnatally, to be free from coerced GE. That is, since 
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PoGE may also close some options rather than open them, the 
child – commensurate with her maturity – may opt against GE, 
rather than become a slave to her extraordinary capacity in a 
specific field through such technology.
GE proponents support such a right, on libertarian grounds. 
GE opponents also typically invoke such a right, while employ-
ing a different rhetoric. Jürgen Habermas, for one, invokes the 
child’s freedom in this respect Habermas (2003, p. 49). He makes 
the point that “[t]he parents’ eugenic freedom is subject to the 
reservation that it must not enter into collision with the ethical 
freedom of their children.” Such freedom allegedly entails both 
the right to be genetically enhanced, and its negative counter-
part – the right not to be genetically enhanced. Such freedom is 
typically constrained by parental authority and autonomy, which 
routinely determine children’s narrative identity to a great extent 
and chart the path along which they make their early (often 
defining) steps in life. It is also constrained by the child’s limited 
capabilities for making such resolutions and lack of the financial 
means necessary for carrying out the enhancement plan. So, 
speaking of a child’s freedom to design herself (including by 
rejection of the option of PoGE) in absolute terms is somewhat 
incoherent as well as impractical. For the dominant paternalistic 
conception is such, that the child is a rather passive recipient 
of parental dictates with respect to rearing her and shaping her 
personality. Accordingly, children do not have a right not to be 
educated nor do they have a right not to be raised according to 
a certain religious faith – at least not absolute rights.18 By the 
same token, children would not have a right not to be geneti-
cally enhanced by their parents or guardians (or the state, where 
applicable). At least, not an absolute one.
Fenton (2006, p. 35, 39), who criticizes Habermas’s negative 
approach to liberal eugenics,19 powerfully makes the argument that
… the parent–child relationship is inherently one of 
inequality; even without explicitly choosing a child’s 
characteristics or traits, a parent has considerable con-
trol over the development of that child and the range of 
options open to her for future development (emphasis 
added – Sivan Tamir).
However, the child’s right not to be genetically enhanced (i.e., 
to be free from coerced GE20) could seemingly be recognized as 
a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing 
one’s child, which is itself constrained, in turn, by two princi-
ples: (1) the above-considered principle of (minor)autonomy; 
and (2) the principle of the child’s human dignity. Notably, the 
principle of human dignity similarly applies to the child’s right 
to be genetically enhanced but seems to apply more strongly 
18 Absolute rights are such rights that are intrinsic to human beings, as such; ones 
that it is the duty of everyone to respect. And in the words of Gewirth (1981, p. 2): 
“A right is absolute when it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, so that it 
can never be justifiably infringed and it must be fulfilled without any exceptions.” 
19 “Liberal eugenics,” is the idea of parental freedom in choosing the genetic char-
acteristics or design of their children, and state neutrality in this respect. See Agar 
(1998, 2004). 
20 Plausibly, everybody (not just children) will have a right to freedom from coerced 
genetic manipulation. 
to its negative counterpart (the child’s right not to be thus 
enhanced). A nuanced outlook would suggest that the principle 
will typically be invoked with respect to the child’s right to be 
genetically enhanced, in the contexts of agency and the ability 
to exercise free will in seeking the GE procedure. However, with 
respect to the child’s right not to be genetically enhanced, human 
dignity will be invoked in the context of respect for the child’s 
will (not to be genetically modified) with regard to the features 
of the specific enhancement project. Namely, PoGE performed 
against the child’s will, the (reasonably foreseeable) outcome of 
which is socially adverse or personally degrading, or any PoGE 
that fails to respect the child’s present identity-description, is 
deemed to harm the child’s human dignity and is consequently 
impermissible.
Now, Habermas (2003, p. 22), also speaks of the “right to an 
unmanipulated genetic heritage,” immune from artificial inter-
vention. The Recommendations of the Council of Europe on 
Genetic Engineering (Parliamentary Assembly, 1982) similarly 
invoke the “right to inherit a genetic pattern, which has not been 
artificially changed.” Such a purported right seems stifling or 
indiscriminately inhibiting any benefiting scientific progress that 
advances the goals of mankind. It also ascribes undue significance 
to human “genetic heritage” or “pattern,” as if it has any relevance 
independently of an individual’s identity or personality. What 
is more, it seems to naïvely assume that genetics, in itself, is an 
inviolable, deterministic legacy. Fenton (2006, p. 41), disputing 
Habermas, provocatively questions whether the “right to a genetic 
inheritance immune from artificial interference,” heralded by 
enhancement opponents, could not in fact be rejected in favor 
of a “right to enhance one’s genome.” (She seems to think that 
it is quite possible, relying on moral common sense that may 
perceive human nature as “valuable, but in no way … sacrosanct 
and inviolable.”).
The child’s right to an Open Future
Feinberg (1980, p. 124–6), has offered an elegant, oft-cited 
classification of rights. The child’s right to an open future – the 
collective term for children’s rights-in-trust – belongs to the 
subcategory of children’s rights (C-rights) that appear as adult 
autonomy rights, but cannot be exercised by the child until her 
decision-making capacity and other features of maturity are 
more fully formed. Such rights are saved for her until adult-
hood since they are prone to violation before the child can 
effectively exercise them. Other scholars have adopted various 
versions of the child’s right to an open future, as a constraint on 
parental autonomy in shaping one’s children (Dworkin, 1982, 
p. 205; Buchanan et  al., 2000, p.  175; Ouellette, 2010). Some 
versions (e.g., Buchanan et  al.’s) are weaker than Feinberg’s at 
times stricter account of a right to “a maximally open future” 
(Buchanan et al., 2000, p. 170).
The child’s right to an open future has been criticized for 
various reasons, inter alia, for being over-demanding, unrealistic, 
and conceptually vague (e.g., open to what extent? incomparable 
different possible futures; and ambiguity as to what makes one 
future more open than another) (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996, p. 
365; Mills, 2003, p. 499; Resnik and Vorhaus, 2006, p. 6; Archard, 
2013). I shall note my own reservations here (while my critique is 
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chiefly aimed at the stronger version of the child’s right to an open 
future, it also generally applies to its weaker accounts):
(a) No one’s future is truly “open.” The future is somewhat unpre-
dictable and inconstant. Things happen that continuously 
narrow and reformulate our future options. Invoked in the 
context of GE, the idea of an attainable “open future” assumes 
perfect control over the results of genetic modification. This 
seems erroneously deterministic, disregarding epigenetic21 
and environmental effects that assure us that genetic expres-
sion can be unpredictable, whether genes are in their natural 
or modified state.
(b) Even adhering to the most stringent standard of neutrality 
with respect to the child’s future (i.e., refraining from affect-
ing her “unlimited” future life course, one way or another), as 
stricter accounts may have us do, could detrimentally affect 
her open future. Take, for example, the adoption of a permis-
sive parenting style. Such forced avoidance, would leave the 
child unguided, uneducated, in utter confusion with regard 
to the values she should uphold, and generally neglected 
and detached. Consequently, it has been argued that it is this 
non-interfering, open parenting manner that perhaps para-
doxically “ends up being autonomy-diminishing” (De Ruyter 
and Schinkel, 2013, p. 382). The child’s autonomy could be 
reduced by such parental neutrality, in two possible senses: 
first, since autonomy is, inter alia, about having an adequate 
range of options to choose from, limiting this range in child-
hood would arguably constrict the child’s optional life plans; 
second, it would go against Raz’s requirement that the exercise 
of personal autonomy must entail a capacity to understand 
valuable, morally acceptable (not neutral) options, from 
which a capacitated individual is required to choose. This 
critique obviously does not apply to much less demanding, 
weaker versions of the child’s right to an open future.
(c) The threat to a child’s open future may also be invoked with 
respect to her current interests and presently realizable rights. 
Therefore, the claim right to an open future, if recognized, 
should not exclusively apply to rights-in-trust, but rather to all 
of the minor’s interests that stand to be violated in a manner 
that might affect her “open” future, requiring the protection 
of parents/guardians.
(d) The duration of relevancy of children’s rights-in-trust, as 
Feinberg (1980, p. 148–150), himself points out, may in fact be 
shorter than it initially appears. Also, we lack a clear-cut line 
beyond which C-rights are replaced by adult (A-) rights. All 
we have are mere approximations. Feinberg concedes that the 
point of full maturity or adulthood is arbitrarily fixed. In reality, 
C-rights-in-trust become adult rights much sooner (by the age 
of 10 or 12). Consequently, children beyond infancy are partly 
adults. In fact, children influence their own shaping from the 
very beginning: initially passively, by showing their “rudimen-
tary character,” and as they grow older – more actively. Parental 
shaping is guided by these displays of character and accordingly 
21 For a comprehensive account of epigenetics and genetic determinism in the 
context of PoGE, see Tamir (2015), p. 62–79. 
(at least ideally) strengthens “the basic tendencies of the child 
as manifested at that stage.” I therefore wonder: if this is a true 
reflection of things, how can parents be expected to discern 
the actual timeframe within which they are responsible to 
protect the child’s open future? Or, how can parents’ decisions 
or actions to preserve such an open future be distinguished 
from those of the child’s, when they supposedly act in sync with 
the child’s own shaping of her future?
(e) Last, a particular reservation concerning the application of 
the right to an open future to the PoGE setting: the puta-
tive right to PoGE is a personal autonomy right, which the 
child cannot presently exercise (at least, not before becoming 
“minorautonomous”). Now, putting the exercise of such a 
right on hold for the child until s/he is an adult, in accordance 
with Feinberg’s account, would self-defeat the entire purpose 
of PoGE. That is, since the rationale of PoGE is to provide 
the child with better life opportunities, by honing genetically 
enhanced traits and skills throughout childhood. So, it is in 
fact, the implementation of PoGE now that will open the 
child’s tomorrow, rather than avoiding it now and deferring 
it until adulthood.
To conclude, significant genetic modification plausibly stands 
to constrain a child’s ideally unfettered horizon, just as education, 
religious indoctrination, and financial limitations do. However, 
the child’s entitlement to an “open” future is an idealistic notion, 
a worthy guide to some extent, but largely impracticable for the 
reasons cited above.
After this rather comprehensive pursuit after a derivative 
child’s right to PoGE (emanating mostly from existing core 
rights), we shall now turn to examine whether a child’s de novo 
right to PoGE is warranted.
shOUlD We creaTe Or recOgniZe a 
nOVel chilD’s righT TO Poge?
Rights talk seems to have become overly extensive and right 
claims too easily made nowadays, invoking concern that “the 
prodigality of rights attributions is damaging to the cause of 
rights.” L.W. Sumner and others critically observe the prolifera-
tion of rights with dwindling value and argumentative power 
Sumner (1987). Sumner (1987, p. 15), rather graphically 
describes the erosion process that a right goes through, starting 
out as a “specialized instrument” and gradually (due to political 
pressures and through the distortion/abuse of the language of 
rights) becoming a general-purpose one. Consequently, as a 
right is stretched farther and farther “beyond its proper domain,” 
it is progressively emptied of its distinctive content, thus bring-
ing about “increasing versatility of rights… purchased at the 
cost of their increasing vacuity.” This seemingly calls for a policy 
of calculated, sparing recognition of novel rights ex nihilo,22 to 
avoid such diminishing effects (Epstein, 1992).
22 The term “ex nihilo” should be broadly construed here in the sense that the 
foundation for the new right was already laid by existing neighbouring rights but 
the new right, per se, is unprecedented. 
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Now, although there is talk about “new claims of rights being 
proliferated daily” (Knowles, 2001, p. 165–6), the reality seems to 
be that unlike the frequent appearance of such claims, which follow 
the emergence of new social goods reflecting certain values (such as 
access to the unprecedented instrument of PoGE), it is not often that 
new independent rights, entrenching such values, are legally recog-
nized. Rather, typically, new values initially tend to be expressed 
through the lax interpretation or artificial extension of “old” 
existing rights. (It is only later, and not always, that society matures 
into explicit, independent acknowledgment of new legal rights.)
The legal acknowledgment of new positive rights is a rare occa-
sion. (A rather fresh example is the “right to be forgotten” “in 
the context of digital memory and/or data retention,” i.e., a right 
against others to have one’s personal data actively erased from 
digital records;23 Weber, 2011, p. 120.) Such rarity is primarily 
(but not exclusively) due to the nature of the democratic process, 
i.e., the many compromises and trade-offs in the legislative body, 
and the pressure exerted by various stakeholders. Moreover, from 
a public policy perspective, rights (particularly new rights) bear 
significant costs and burdens when they generate new duties, in 
terms of informing the general public about these duties, and 
constructing, financing and regulating new mechanisms for real-
izing such rights, particularly their enforcement.
In principle, the recognition or creation of a novel positive 
right of the child to PoGE would also require justification. On a 
general level, it ought to be taken into account that the recogni-
tion of such a right will broaden the scope of presently recognized 
children’s rights, potentially breaching it by (undesirably?) 
introducing a new category of children’s rights (in addition to 
the already existing ones of the CRC – “human and civil rights,” 
and “protective rights”) – that of “improvement rights.” On the 
other hand, seemingly, such a right would promote the interests 
of individuals in self-determination, self-creation, and self-
improvement. Nevertheless, while children deserve to have their 
basic needs provided for, to thrive and prosper and to have good 
opportunities in life – it is not clear that they necessarily deserve 
the best or optimal opportunities, potentially facilitated by PoGE!
And indeed, Bostrom and Sandberg (2009, p. 333), maintain 
with respect to cognitive enhancement, that it is not quite clear 
“whether access to all enhancements should or would be regarded 
23 The “right to be forgotten” “reflects the claim of an individual to have certain 
data deleted so that third persons can no longer trace them… [it] is based on the 
autonomy of an individual becoming a right holder in respect of personal informa-
tion on a time scale” (Weber, 2011, p. 121). The right is recognized in EU law [“the 
right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’),” Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 17 and 
Directive (EU) 2016/680]. Its status, however, is somewhat perplexing. While it may 
be considered for a status of a new fundamental right within the body of human 
rights, it could also be merely a derivative right of the fundamental “right of the 
protection of personal data,” recognized in article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Charter of Fundamentalghts Right of the European Union (2012). On the other 
hand, art. 8 does not specifically refer to the option of erasure of personal data. 
Also of interest with respect to the nature of this right, is the ruling of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in a case brought before it (Google Spain SL v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos, 2014), where “the Court explicitly clarified that 
the right to be forgotten is not absolute but will always need to be balanced against 
other fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression and of the media (para 
85 of the ruling)” (European Commission, 2014). I shall not delve further into this 
intriguing novel right, as it exceeds the scope of this paper. 
as a positive right”; whereas “[t]he case for at least a negative 
right to cognitive enhancement, based on cognitive liberty, pri-
vacy interests, and… capacity for autonomy, seems very strong” 
(emphases added – Sivan Tamir).
I agree that the case for a negative right would, in theory, be 
more plausible than that for a positive one, for the following 
cumulative reasons, which correlate with the policy consid-
erations mentioned at the outset of this paper: (a) GE will most 
probably be available on the free market and will not be cost-free 
(except, perhaps, for a state-funded once-in-a-lifetime basic 
enhancement package); (b) a positive right – either derivative 
or a newly emerging independent one – will potentially invoke 
considerably burdening correlative legal (and moral) duties 
imposed upon parents and the state to supply the demand for 
this benefiting technology; and (b1) arguably, such duties would, 
respectively, exceed parental obligations to satisfy the best interests 
of the child, reasonably and proportionally construed – namely, 
recognizing the limitations of available options, the needs, rights, 
and interests of others (parents and other siblings), and the fact 
that family members’ lives are intertwined (Kopelman, 1997); as 
well as state’s typically limited resources, additionally bound by 
principles of distributive justice, which may weigh against such 
elective expenditure.
So, while the child’s interest in being genetically enhanced 
postnatally may be construed as intrinsically valuable to her 
(i.e., of ultimate value),24 this is not necessarily sufficient to 
justify holding others (such as parents and the state) legally 
duty-bound on this ground (Raz, 1986, p. 189). Consequently, it 
would be hard to justify a new positive right (be it independent 
or derivative) based on the child’s interests of self-determination 
and self-improvement.
However, the case for such a negative child’s right is not 
compelling either, since particularly young children would typi-
cally not be the initiators of such use of shaping technology, and 
would actually require the active involvement of their parents/
guardians in executing and financing the enhancement plan. 
A non-interfering, stand-off position of the latter, namely, paren-
tal/guardian neutrality in this respect, might therefore even deny 
them the promotion of their interests through GE.
Last, another policy consideration, which might bear influ-
ence on the strength of the claim for such a child’s right, is what 
we may term the “realizability factor.” Whether a child’s claim 
for PoGE is a positive or a negative right, we might have to take 
into account the prospects of actually realizing it. To put it more 
straightforwardly, in light of potential epigenetic influences, the 
genetic modification may be incapable of guaranteeing the fulfil-
ment of the enhancement plan (in part or in full), exactly as origi-
nally intended.25 Policymakers considering the acknowledgment 
24 Raz (1986, p. 177–180), maintains that a right should be based upon an interest 
of ultimate value, which he defines as one that is “… non-derivative…, intrinsically 
valuable… independently of one’s instrumental value.” 
25 This suggestion hinges on the assumption that the understanding and control 
of epigenetic mechanisms will remain limited as they presently are. However, it is 
not improbable that by the time PoGE will be prevalently practiced, the enigma 
of epigenetic effects will also be resolved, hence making any such reservations 
redundant.
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of a child’s right to PoGE, under any framework, ought therefore 
also to take into account that rights are too serious a matter to be 
protecting shaky unrealizable interests.
cOnclUsiOn
The purpose of this paper was to identify potential sources 
for- and analyze the nature of a purported child’s right to 
be genetically enhanced postnatally. Due to our epistemic 
inability to accurately predict the future state of affairs, our 
analysis has relied on existing law and presently prevalent 
(Western-)liberal morality. I have examined the suitability of 
several potential fundamental rights to serve as core rights 
from which the child’s right to PoGE may derive. My initial 
conclusions were that such putative right could, prima facie, 
be a derivative of the right to personal (minor)autonomy, as 
well as a derivative of children’s development and participatory 
rights, in the case of infants and younger children who cannot 
yet reside under minorautonomy. Further exploration, how-
ever, has shown that the direct translation of any of the child’s 
interests in GE into any kind of recognized positive or negative 
right – whether derivative or a newly emerging independent 
right – is unlikely. Such improbability is mainly attributed to 
the considerably burdening correlative legal (and moral) duties 
that a positive right to supply the demand for this non-essential 
technology would impose upon parents and the state; and to 
the anticipated situation that likely would require the active 
involvement of parents/guardians in executing and financing 
the GE plan, which does not conform with a negative right of 
non-interference.
As per the putative child’s right not to be genetically enhanced 
postnatally, I determined that such a right could be recognized 
as a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing 
and shaping one’s child.
I believe that conducting such deliberation ahead of time is 
a worthy thought experiment that would be valuable for forth-
coming regulatory debates, by laying down the foundations for 
an appropriate ethico-legal framework, before GE technologies 
become state-of-the-art techniques.
Naturally, any such analysis that does not grapple with the 
chief implication of rights – their respective duties – is incom-
plete. Albeit making some assumptions regarding the burden of 
such potential duties and its negative effect on the prospect of 
recognizing such a right, there are still several aspects that require 
contemplation: first and foremost – whether or not traditional 
childrearing duties, broadly construed, should encompass a legal 
duty to genetically enhance one’s offspring, postnatally. This 
weighty issue deserves separate consideration.
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